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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
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v.
Vaughn Humphrey#
Harry Jamar Gordan#
and Bruce Mathews#
Defendants/Appellants«

Case No. 890424-CA
890130-CA
890666-CA
Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals, upon its affirmance of three district court rulings
indicating that district courts do not have jurisdiction over
quashal of bindover orders issued by magistrates following
preliminary hearings.
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STATE OF UTAH

October 2, 1990

OCT 2 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

qoomy

State v. Vaughn Humphrey, et a h
Case No. 890424-CA

Dear Mr. Butler:
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in
Opposition will be provided.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,

SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
SLS:jln
cc: Elizabeth Holbrook, Attorney for Petitioner
Enclosures

496

Bt»h

7*4 PACIFIC REPORTER, M SERIES

the placement of the signs on specific sites -Over for trial, 'fhe Third District Court,
which were the same locations occupied by Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya and
•the signs at the time the present parties Frank G. Noel, JJ., declined to exercise
**ecuted the existing tease, and that the jurisdiction, and defendants appealed. Apparties intended the tease to continue Rea- peals ware consolidated. The Court of Apgan's right to maintain the signs only in peals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendants'
their existing locations. Although the evi- requests for review of legality of bindover
dence is controverted, "we assume that the
orders did not invoke district court's origitrial judge believed those aspects of the
nal jurisdiction, but rather were more accu{evidence and the inferences reasonably
rately
characterized as appeals, and (2) de-drawn from them that support his decifendants'
requests were not within appelsion.'! Redevelopment Agency, 785 ?M
late
jurisdiction
of district court.
at 1122 (quoting Brixen & Christopher,
Architects v. Elton, TH P.2d 1039, 1042
Affirmed.
(Utah CtApp.1989)). Under our standard
of review, we will not set aside a trial
court's findings unless they are against the
clear weight of the evidence or we other- 1. Criminal Law t»1004
wise reach a definite and firm conviction
Defendants' motions to quash circuit
that a mistake has been made, Smith v. court bindover orders did not invoke disLinmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, trict court's broad original jurisdiction, but
1224-1225 (Utah CtApp.1990), and we give rather were more accurately characterized
deference to the trial court's findings and as appeal, inasmuch as defendants sought
its opportunity to judge the credibility of review of substantive merits of bindover
the witnesses. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
orders on records. U.C.A.1953, 77-35Having examined the record, we con- 10(c), 77-35-12(bKl); Const Art 8, J 5.
dude that the trial court's findings have
adequate evidentiary support and are not 2. Criminal Law *=>1018
clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm
District court's appellate jurisdiction
its judgment.
must be conferred by statute. Const Art
8, § 5 .
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Vaughn HUMPHREY, Defendant
and Appellant
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Harry Jamar GORDON, Defendant
and Appellant
Nos. 890424-CA, 890130-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Defendants charged with felonies challenged circuit court orders binding them

S. Criminal Law *»1018
District court did not have appellate
jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to
circuit court orders binding defendants
over for trial, in absence of any statutory
delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legislature vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in
Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15,
77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2Xd), 78-3-4(5).

Elizabeth Bowman, Elizabeth Holbrook
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legs)
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appelant, Humphrey.
James C. Bradshaw, Elizabeth Holbrook
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake UP 1
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appelant, Gordon.
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R. Paul Van Dajn, Atty. Gen., Sandra
Sjogren (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee the
State.
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
We have consolidated two criminal, interlocutory appeals for decision as they
present the identical legal issue. Appellants Vaughn Humphrey ("Humphrey")
and Harry Jamar Gordon ("Gordon") appeal from two separate decisions of a district court wherein the trial judge concluded the district court did not have jurisdiction to review defendants' bindover orders
from circuit court We affirm.
Humphrey was charged with sixteen second or third degree felonies. Gordon was
charged with manslaughter, a second degree felony. In both cases, the circuit
court held preliminary hearings and bound
defendants over for trial Both defendants
were ultimately arraigned before the district court
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon
each filed a "motion to quash" his respective bindover in district court, alleging the
state had failed to establish probable cause
that he had committed the crimes with
which he was charged. In response, the
state argued the district court had no jurisdiction to consider defendants' motions.
The district courts concluded defendants
were, in substance, seeking an appellate
review on the record of the circuit courts'
bindover orders and that jurisdiction of
these interlocutory appeals was vested in
the Utah Court of Appeals, not the district
court Humphrey and Gordon then filed
these interlocutory appeals.
This consolidated opinion requires us to
determine whether the district courts properly declined to exercise jurisdiction. This
presents a question of law and thus we
accord no deference to the trial courts'
conclusions, but review them under a "correctness" standard. City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).

To resolve this jurisdictional question, we
review the recent constitutional and statutory changes in the jurisdiction of the dietrict courts and the contemporaneous provisions which created the Utah Court of Appeals. As such, we are faced with an issue
of first impression.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
[1] Initially, defendants argue their motions to quash their bindover orders invoked the district court's original jurisdiction. J
Article VHI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution currently provides, in pertinent
part
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and
power to issue all extraordinary writs.
Utah Const art VIII, § 5.
The district courts are given broad original jurisdiction by the Utah Constitution
limited only by specific constitutional or
statutory provisions. Statutory reference
to the district court's original jurisdiction
does not limit its broad jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1989) provides: 'The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal.... " Id at § 7&-3-4(l). We disagree
that the defendants' motions to quash their
bindover orders invoked the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
The Utah Supreme Court recently dealt
with the issue of what constitutes an appeal. Although the supreme court held
that the constitutional right to an appeal is
satisfied by a statutory trial de novo in a
court of record, City of Monticello *
Chrietensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990),
its decision does not refute the standard
rule that "appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the action or judgments
of an inferior tribunal upon the record
made in that tribunal and to affirm, modify
or reverse." Peatrom * Board of
CommH 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976);
see also Christen***, 788 P^dat 520 (Durham, J., dissenting). Defendants requested
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the district courts to review their bindover
orders upon the record and requested the
orders be reversed on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. This review falls
aquarely within the classic definition of an
appeal.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court,
in dicta, in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985), characterized an attack on
a bindover order as an appeal, stating:
Section 77-35-2(bX3) provides that an appeal may be taken by the defendant
"[fjrom an interlocutory order when,
upon petition for review, the supreme
court decides that such an appeal would
be in the interest of justice
" That
statute governs all appeals from bindover orders entered in any court
Id at 270.
In support of their position, defendants
claim that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure authorizes the district
court to hear motions to quash bindover
orders as part of its original jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Rule 12(bXl) states:
(b) Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised prior to trial
by written motion. The following shall
be raised at least five days prior to the
trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on
defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during
the pendency of the proceeding;
Defendants read too much into Rule 12.
In their motions to quash the bindover orders, defendants did not object to defects in
the informations. Rather, they objected to
the orders of the circuit courts binding

Hiem over for trial. Rule 12(bXl) governs
objections to the information itself, not objections to an order of the circuit court
finding that there was sufficient evidence
presented in the preliminary hearing to
support a finding of probable cause.1

1. Defendants cite State v. Brickey, 714 V2d 644
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the district
court has original jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court. In Brickey,
after describing the circumstances allowing a
refiling of an information and finding that those
circumstances were not present, the court concluded, "the district court should have quashed

the bindover." Mat 648. However, defendants
concede that the statutory and constitutional
changes limiting the district courts' appellate
jurisdiction over the circuit courts occurred in
July 1986, six months after Brickey was decided.
Thus, the language referred to in Brickey is not
helpful in our resolution of this issue.

Defendants also rely on Rule 10(c) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming
it requires the district court to dispose of
all objections relating to the preliminary
bearing during the exercise of the district
court's original criminal jurisdiction. Rule
10(c) states:
Any defect or irregularity in or want
or absence of any proceeding provided
for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to before a plea of
guilty is entered or the same is waived.
We read Rule 10(c) to merely reaffirm
the general legal rule that all objections,
including those to proceedings in the circuit
court, must be made before a guilty plea is
entered or the objections will be waived.
We are not dealing with the entry of a
guilty plea in these appeals and thus do not
find Rule 10(c) relevant to our analysis.
We are not persuaded by defendants'
attempts to demonstrate that their motions
to quash the bindover orders invoked the
district courts' original criminal jurisdiction. Rather, we agree with the district
courts that defendants seek a review of the
substantive merits of the bindover orders
on the record, a review more accurately
characterized as an appeal.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
[2,3] Alternatively, defendants argue
that even if we characterize defendants'
requests for review of the legality of the
bindover orders as appeals, the district
court has jurisdiction.

STATE v. HUMPHREY
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Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides: "The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by
statute." Utah Const art VIII, § 5. Unlike its 1896 predecessor which provided
that a district court had "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and supervisory control of the same,"l article VIII, section 5 now limits the district
courts' appellate jurisdiction to only that
specifically provided for by statute. DeBry v. Salt Lake County BcL of Appeals,
764 P.2d 627, 627 (Utah CtApp.1988).*
The only reference to the appellate jurisdiction of the district court states: "The
district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set
forth in Chapter 46b, Title 6 3 . . . . " 4 Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(5) (1989). The district
court's jurisdiction over agency adjudicative proceedings is further limited by Utah
Code Ann. § 6&-46b-15 (1989) to only inform
mal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, the
only appellate jurisdiction statutorily delegated to the district court is to review
informal agency adjudicative proceedings.
Under the current statutory scheme, the
legislature has vested appellate jurisdiction
2. Utah Const art. VIII, § 7 (1953).
3. The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced
the principle that the district court's appellate
jurisdiction must be conferred by statute:
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that
"the district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute" and that "the
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original
and appellate, shall be provided by statute."
This language is plain and unambiguous.
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
518 (Utah 1990).
4. Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 7*-3-4 (1953)
provided, in pertinent part: The district court
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law; appellate juris*
diction from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and a supervisory control over the same."
5. Also relevant is Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-11
(1987), which states in pertinent part, with our
emphasis, that: "Except as otherwise directed
by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the
Court of Appeals."
6. A magistrate is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1-3(4) (1990) as *a justice of the Supreme

over circuit court proceedings in the Utah
Court of Appeals. Utah Code Aifn.
§ 78-2a-3(2Xd) (1989) reads:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.
(d) appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims department of a circuit court9
Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2Xd) (1989) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit court in the Utah Court of Appeals.
We agree, but do not understand how this
helps defendants. Defendants must still
point to some statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to the district court City
of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
518 (Utah 1990).
Next, defendants correctly point out that
the circuit courts were sitting as magistrates, not in their normal jurisdictional
capacity, when they entered the bindover
orders.4 Defendants argue that when the
circuit court acts as a magistrate under
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 the bindover order is not a normal
Court, a judge of the district courts, a judge of
the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any
court created by law." The Utah Supreme
Court in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1977), held that a circuit court conducting
a preliminary hearing is not acting as a circuit
court but as a magistrate. The court explained:
A preliminary examination does not invoke
the jurisdiction of the court In such a proceeding* the action is not action by a judge of
any court, but that of a magistrate, a distinct
statutory office. Justices of the Supreme
Court, district judges, city court judges, and
justices of the peace, when sitting as magistrates having the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those
that pertain to their respective judicial offices.
Id at 1327.
7. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part
(8Kb) If from the evidence a magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound
over in the district court....
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has
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judgment or order of the circuit court
They, therefore, reason that this is an exception to the general delegation of appellate jurisdiction over circuit court orders to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Again, we do not disagree with the defendants' argument in the abstract, but
cannot decipher how the argument helps
them. Defendants st31 point to no statute
giving the district court jurisdiction over
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-S(2Xe) (1989) vests "interlocutory
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a first
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was
acting as a court of record in a criminal
case when it held the preliminary hearing.
Finally, both defendants make a number
of policy arguments in favor of giving the
district courts jurisdiction over objections
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of
the evidence. Although some of their contentions have merit,8 such arguments must
be made to the legislature. It is the legislature which is charged with the task of
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction
and we cannot modify its decisions because
we believe policy considerations so dictate.
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of
the district courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.

Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
And Appellee,
•.

Dorothy D'ASTON, et a!., Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 8W050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Action was brought for divorce. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and
wife appealed, challenging property distribution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d
590, ordered wife to submit herself to process of lower court within SO days or her
appeal would be dismissed. After wife
gave notice of compliance with order, merits of appeal were addressed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) postnuptial agreement not made in contemplation of divorce was enforceable, absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure,
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambiguously provided that it would apply to disposition of spouses' property in event of
divorce.
I
Reversed and remanded.
1. Husband and Wife <*»30
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or
material nondisclosure.
2. Husband and Wife <*=»30
Postnuptial agreement not in contemplation of divorce is enforceable absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.
3. Husband and Wife «=>31(2)
Normal rules of contract construction
would be applied in resolving disagreement

been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant The
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

& Defendants correctly claim that because the
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is discretionary, defendants might be forced to go
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is
denied.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890424-CA

v.
Priority 2

VAUGHN HUMPHREY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court
order denying a motion to quash the circuit court bindover order.
This Court granted a petition for permission to appeal.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann.
SS 77-35-26(2)(c) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
!•

Does a district court have appellate jurisdiction

to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the
circuit court supporting the order binding the defendant over for
trial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all relevant statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with 16 counts including
one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree

felony; five counts of theft by deception, second degree
felonies; five counts of false odometer statements, third degree
felonies; and five counts of selling or transferring automobiles
with altered odometers, third degree felonies, on March 17, 1989
(R. 9-16).

After a preliminary hearing which was held on May 4,

1989, Circuit Court Judge Eleanor Van Sciver bound defendant over
for trial on May 9, 1989 (R. 2). Defendant was arraigned on May
19, 1989 before District Court Judge James S. Sawaya (R. 31).
On May 26, 1989, defendant moved in the district court
to quash the circuit court bindover order on the grounds that the
evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause that
defendant committed the crimes (R. 32-7).

On June 16, 1989,

Judge Sawaya denied the motion, stating that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at preliminary hearing, and continued the trial without
date (T. 3, R. 50-3).
On June 23, 1989, defendant petitioned this Court for
permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 54-9).

This Court

granted interlocutory review on August 2, 1989 (R. 99).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
There are no additional facts other than those set
forth in the Statement of the Case, above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district courts do not have jurisdiction to review
the evidence supporting the bindover orders of circuit courts.
The statute previously providing the district courts with

-2-

appellate and supervisory authority over the circuit courts was
amended in 1986 and the authority was eliminated.

Defendant

should have filed an interlocutory appeal petition in this Court
directly from the circuit court order rather than filing a motion
to quash in the district court if he wished appellate review of
the bindover order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
Defendant characterized his action in the district
court as a motion to quash the bindover order.

He argues that he

was not seeking appellate review in the district court.
Nonetheless, regardless of defendant's characterization, what
defendant sought was review on the record from the circuit court
of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to that court.

He

requested the district court to reverse the order of the circuit
court based upon that review.

See Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Quash the Bindover at R. 33-7. This type of on-therecord review of the sufficiency of the evidence with the
requested relief being reversal of the order reviewed can be
nothing other than appellate review.

The district court ruled

that it lacked authority to review bindover orders of the circuit
court and denied the motion to quash.

This ruling was correct.

Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution
states:

"The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as

provided by statute."

This provision was adopted in 1985 and

markedly contrasts with its 1896 predecessor, which provided that

a district court has Mappellate jurisdiction from all inferior
courts and tribunals, and supervisory control of the same."
Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4(1) provided:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
same.
See 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 50.

In 1986, the jurisdiction of

the district court was redefined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
(Supp. 1989).

Subsection (1) states:

"The district court has

original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal . .
The only reference to appellate jurisdiction is in subsection
(5):

"The district court has jurisdiction to review agency

adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63 .
. .."

Thus, the district court has no authority to review the

orders of a circuit court under the only statute granting it
appellate authority.

This Court is vested with jurisdiction to

review the orders of circuit courts in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d) (Supp. 1989).

Accordingly, if defendant wished review of

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory appeal from
the circuit court order.
(Utah 1985).

State v. Schreuderf 712 P.2d 264, 270

As the Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code

Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989), governs appeals from bindover
orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the right to
petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order.

-4-

Defendant cites State v, Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986), for the proposition that the district court has
jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court.
Defendant fails to note that the amendment of the statute
previously granting the district court appellate jurisdiction
over circuit courts, which limits its appellate jurisdiction to
agency adjudicative proceedings, occurred in 1986.
was effective July 1, 1986.

The amendment

1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 82.

Brickey was decided on January 24, 1986, nearly 6 months prior to
the effective date of the amendment.

At that time, the statute

governing the district court's appellate jurisdiction did allow
the district court to exercise supervisory and appellate
authority over the circuit courts.
50.

See 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 47 §

The statute no longer vests such authority in the district

court and Brickey no longer applies.

To the extent that this

Court's statement in State v. Martinez, Case No. 860255-CA, slip
op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1988) (unpublished opinion),
that Brickey recognizes an appellate authority in the district
court is inconsistent with the district court's current statutory
authority, it should not be followed.
Defendant asserts that the district court has original
jurisdiction to hear the motion to quash a circuit court bindover

It is unclear what precedential value can be
attributed to an unpublished opinion, thus, the use of the phrase
"should not be followed." If this Court believes it would be
more appropriate to overrule Martinez on this point, then the
State requests the Court to do so.
-*_

order.

Thus, he contends that the district court could review

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing.

This assertion relies upon defendant's mis-

characterization of the review he sought as something other than
appellate review.

As stated more fully above, what defendant

sought from the district court was review of the circuit court
record and a determination by the district court that the record
was insufficient to support the order.
than appellate review.

This is nothing other

Section 78-3-4 and art. VIII, § 5 both

speak of original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction as
separate classes of jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction is the

authority of a court to hear matters originally filed in that
court.

Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a court to

review orders of other tribunals.

By simply characterizing his

motion as an original action in the district court, defendant
cannot transform appellate review into something that is included
in the district court's original jurisdictional authority.

If

this were possible, anyone could characterize anything in a way
in which they could obtain a hearing in the court of their choice
rather than in the court that is designated to hear the matter.
Cf. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (constitutional grant of general appellate
jurisdiction does not grant specific appellate jurisdiction where
there is no statutory appellate authority over the tribunal
appealed from).
Defendant also refers to Utah R. Crim. P. 12 for the
district court's authority to quash bindovers.

-6-

Defendant

correctly states that the district court can dismiss a criminal
action where there are defects in the indictment or information;
however, he reads too much into the Rule 12 provision.

Rule 12

states:
(b) Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised prior to trial by
written motion. The following shall be
raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects
in the indictment or information other than
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense, which
objection shall be noticed by the court at
any time during the pendency of the
proceeding; . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) (1982, repealed effective July 1,
1990).

Defendant's reliance on this rule is misplaced because he

was not objecting to any defects in the information.

Rather, he

objected to the order of the circuit court binding him over for
trial.

Rule 12(b)(1) governs objections to the information

itself and not objections to an order of the circuit court.

The

rule does not create an appellate authority in the district court
that otherwise does not exist.
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that this
Court should place appellate review of bindover orders in the
hands of the district court in the interest of judicial economy.
Not only are defendant's arguments weak, but they encourage this
Court to make a policy decision that may only be made by the
Legislature*

-7-

Defendant asserts that the district court could more
quickly dispose of the issue of whether a bindover was supported
by sufficient evidence than could this Court.

He asserts that

Rule 12 governs such a review and that he is required to raise
the issue at least five days prior to trial.

He argues,

therefore, that the district court would necessarily decide the
issue during the five days prior to trial and that this process
would be much faster than interlocutory review.
There are several flaws in defendant's scheme of
review.

First, defendant's assertion that the district court

would review the case much more quickly is not necessarily
accurate.
date —

Defendant's review scheme is attached to the trial

a date that, for many reasons, may be continued

repeatedly.

A criminal trial is rarely set so soon after a

bindover that a motion to quash based upon insufficient evidence
would be disposed of sooner than this Court could hear an
interlocutory appeal.

Under defendant's scheme, a defendant's

motion to quash could be filed five days prior to trial even if
the trial date was not scheduled until several months after the
preliminary hearing and bindover.
Further, by filing his request for review as a motion
to quash in the district court, defendant creates for himself the
ability to file an interlocutory appeal petition from an adverse
ruling of the district court.

Instead of creating a more

efficient system of review, defendant creates a system in which
he hopes to obtain two separate reviews of the same issue.

-8-

An interlocutory appeal petition, on the other hand, is
attached to the order appealed from.

A petition for permission

to appeal must be filed within 20 days from the order appealed
from.

See State v. Tiffany, Case no. 890595-CA (order filed Jan.

4, 1990).

This date is much more predictable than one which is

tied to an uncertain trial date which is dependant upon court
scheduling and any other proceedings that might be required prior
to trial, such as competency evaluations, motions to suppress
evidence, etc.
Second, defendant assumes that the district court could
review the record of the preliminary hearing during the five days
prior to trial.

This assumption is unrealistic.

Because the

district court's primary function is to hear trials, it would be
required to fit the review of a bindover order into its already
overcrowded trial schedule.

The court might be required to read

several volumes of transcript from the preliminary hearing to
properly evaluate a defendant's claim of insufficient evidence.
Such a review requires time, thus, a five-day expectation is
impractical.
Third, defendant asserts that this Court's review
process would be even further delayed because this Court must
determine whether to accept the appeal and then the case would
follow the normal schedule for preparation of transcripts and
briefing which he asserts is too lengthy.
exists, is easily rectified.

This problem, if it

This Court could treat criminal

interlocutory appeals with expedition and could require the
parties to adhere to an expedited briefing schedule.
need not grant extensions for preparation of briefs.

This Court

Moreover, defendant cannot seriously be suggesting that
the preparation of transcripts for this Court's review would
require any more time than would the preparation of transcripts
for the district court's review.

Nor can he seriously be

suggesting that a district court could review the sufficiency of
the evidence presented to another court without reviewing the
record that was created in that court.

This Court's primary

function is appellate review of the records created in lower
courts.

This Court is well-equipped to perform that function.

There is no need for a criminal trial to be delayed by this Court
any longer than it would be delayed by the district court for
consideration of the same issue.
Even though defendant asserts that this Court is unable
to review the bindover order as skillfully as the district court,
this Court is well-equipped to review the sufficiency of the
evidence that has been presented to a lower tribunal.

Indeed,

this Court is frequently called upon to review the sufficiency of
the evidence in criminal cases.

Defendant's assertion that the

trial court is better able to review fact intensive issues misses
the mark because this assertion would only be valid if the
district court heard additional evidence.

Of course, neither the

State nor the defendant could claim that a circuit court order
should stand or fall based upon evidence that was not presented
to the circuit court.

Thus, defendant's argument is baseless.

Finally, even if this Court thought that policy
considerations dictated that the district court is the
appropriate forum for appellate review of circuit court bindover

-10-

orders, this Court has no authority to place jurisdiction in the
district court.

Article VIII, S 5 authorizes the district courts

to exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.

There

is no statutory authority for district courts to review the
orders of circuit courts.

For this reason,

the district court

correctly denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover order,
and this Court should affirm the district court's order.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion
to quash the circuit court order binding him over for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
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day of January,
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the Court of Appeals misconstrue statutes,
constitutional provisions, and decisions of this Court in
determining that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
quashal of preliminary hearing bindover orders and that the
district courts do not?
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Copies of the Court of Appeals1 decisions and the order
denying rehearing are included in Appendix 1.
JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT
These three cases came separately before the Court of
Appeals as interlocutory appeals on the sole issue of district
court jurisdiction over preliminary hearing bindover orders.
The Court of Appeals consolidated the Humphrey and
Gordan cases in an opinion filed June 14, 1990.

The Court of

Appeals issued a separate opinion in the Mathews case, which was
filed on June 21, 1990.

The Court of Appeals consolidated the

three cases in its order denying rehearing filed August 15, 1990.
1

This Court is granted statutory jurisdiction over
petitions for writs of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals by
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5),
law power to issue the writs.

and is also vested with common

Utah Constitution, Article VIII,

section 3.2
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutory and constitutional provisions
are provided in full, either in the body of the petition, or in
Appendix 2:
Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 1
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 3
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 4
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 5
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4)
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-2
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5)
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e)
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c)
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(c)
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1)
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In each of these cases the Appellants were bound over
to district courts, in which courts they moved to quash the
bindover orders issued by the magistrates.

The district courts

1
See Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 (listing
examples circumstances in which this Court might exercise its
discretion in granting the writ).
2
See Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Utah
1981)(discussing breadth of common law powers).
2

ruled that they had no jurisdiction over the bindover orders
issued by the magistrates.
The Utah Court of Appeals allowed interlocutory appeals
of the district court rulings indicating that the district
courts have no jurisdiction to quash bindover orders.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed the district court rulings, holding that (1)
the district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over
magistratesf and the Court of Appeals' interlocutory appeal
jurisdiction is the appropriate avenue for disposition of motions
3
to quash bindover orders following preliminary hearings; and (2)
bindover quashal is an appellate function that must occur in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, rather than during the
district court's exercise of original jurisdiction.
B. FACTS
These cases have not yet gone to trial. There are no
facts pertinent to the legal issue addressed by the Court of
Appeals and currently before this Court.
REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF WRIT
This Court should grant certiorari in these cases
because the Court of Appeals misconstrued statutes,
constitutional provisions, and decisions of this Court in
reaching the conclusion that bindover quashal cannot be performed
by district courts, and must be disposed of through interlocutory
3
1990).
4

State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 498-500 (Utah App.
State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497-498 (Utah App. 1990).
3

appeal.

See Monson v. Hall, 584 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1978)("One

of the cardinal rules of statutory construction requires
construction with the objective of bringing consonance to
Constitutional and statutory provisions, which will be congruous
with expressed intent, and the applicability of the law in
general•").
This jurisdictional question is an important question
of Utah law that should be decided by this Court, which is vested
with the power to regulate procedure in the courts of this
state.
A. IN HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER
BINDOVER QUASHAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE
STATUTES AND A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION GOVERNING THE ISSUE,
WHICH STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INDICATE THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER BINDOVER ORDERS.
In the Humphrey opinion, the court acknowledged that
under this Court's opinion in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1977), the magistrate issuing the bindover order was not
acting as a circuit court.

The Court of Appeals then proceeded

5
Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution
provides this Court's rule making authority.
6

The Humphrey opinion states,
A magistrate is defined in Utah Code
Ann. section 77-1-3(4)(1990) as " a justice
of the Supreme Court, a judge of the district
courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a
judge of the circuit courts and a justice of
the peace or a judge of any court created by
law." The Utah Supreme Court in Van Dam v.
Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1988), held that
a circuit court conducting a preliminary
hearing is not acting as a circuit court but
as a magistrate. The court explained:
A preliminary examination does
not invoke the jurisdiction of the
4

to find that in issuing the bindover order, the magistrate was
acting as a court of record, stating,
In fact# Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1989) vests "interlocutory appeals from any
court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a first degree or capital
felony" in the Utah Court of Appeals.
Certainly the magistrate was acting as a
court of record in a criminal case when it
neiq tne preliminary nearing.
Humphrey at 500 (emphasis added).
This conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
magistrate was certainly acting as a court of record conflicts
with Utah statutory and constitutional law.

Utah Code Ann.

sections 78-1-1 and 78-l-2# which constitute the statutory
enumeration of courts of record,

do not indicate that
o

magistrates are courts of record.
court. In such a proceeding, the
action is not action by a judge or
any court, but that of a
magistrate, a distinct statutory
office. Justices of the Supreme
Court, district judges, city court
judges, and justices of the peace,
when sitting as magistrates having
the jurisdiction and powers
conferred by law upon magistrates
and not those that pertain to their
respective judicial offices.
Id. at 1327.
Humphrey page 499 n.6. See also discussion in body of text at
499-500.
7
Article VIII section 1 of the Utah Constitution vests
the legislature with the power to enumerate courts of record.
8

Section 78-1-1 provides,
The following are the courts of justice in
this state:
(1) the Supreme Court;
(2) the Court of Appeals

5

The Utah Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding that
its interlocutory appeal jurisdiction is the appropriate avenue
for motions to quash improper bindover orders.

The Court of

Appeals in fact has no appellate jurisdiction over the
magistrates' bindover orders.

See Constitution of Utah Article

VIII section 5 and Debry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals,
764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah App. 1988)(Utah Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction unless it is specifically provided for by
statute); Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (describing the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals).
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT BINDOVER QUASHAL MUST BE
TREATED AS AN APPEAL CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH GOVERNING
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND IS AN UNDULY RIGID
INTERPRETATION OF THIS COURT'S DECISIONS.
1. Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals agreed that
if bindover quashal is characterized as an appeal, it must be
available as a matter of right.

In a rather perplexing footnote,

the court stated:
Defendants correctly claim that because
the decision to allow an interlocutory appeal
is discretionary, defendants might be forced
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

the
the
the
the

district courts;
circuit courts;
juvenile courts; and
justices' courts.

Section 78-1-2 provides,
The courts enumerated in the first five
subdivisions [subsections] of the preceding
section [section 78-1-1] are courts of
record.
6

to go through an unnecessary trial if the
right to file an interlocutory appeal of the
bindover is denied*
Id. at 500 n. 8 (emphasis added).
Under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
the accused has "the right to appeal in all cases." Article VIII
section 5 of the Utah Constitution reiterates the mandatory
nature of the right to "appeal" the bindover order if the order
is characterized as an appeal.

It states, in part, "Except for

matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the
cause."
Despite the mandatory nature of appeals under these
constitutional provisions, however, the Court of Appeals found
that the appropriate jurisdictional provision for disposition of
bindover orders was the court's interlocutory appeal provision.
Humphrey at 500. As the Court of Appeals footnote 8 seems to
acknowledge, interlocutory appeals are not appeals of right, but
are discretionary with the court.

See also Utah Rule of

Appellate Procedure 5(e) and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
26(2)(c) (making interlocutory appeals discretionary with the
court).
The Court of Appeals' intimation that the right to
appeal an improper bindover order might be salvaged after an
"unnecessary trial if the right to file an interlocutory appeal
of the bindover order is denied" fails to recognize that pre7

trial errors are generally considered cured and mooted by
trials, in which the full panoply of constitutional rights apply.
See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1).

Cf. State v.

Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah App. 1988)(defective arrest
warrant does not void subsequent conviction), citing State v.
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 271-272 (Utah 1985)(same); and Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 125 (1975)(absence of pretrial
determination of probable cause to detain without an arrest
warrant does not void a subsequent conviction).
2. Case law
Rejecting the assertion that bindover quashal may occur
during the district courts' exercise of unlimited original
9
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals insisted that bindover
quashal must be characterized as an appeal.

The court quoted the

definition of "appeal" in Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs, 555 P.2d
281 (Utah 1976),
[A]ppellate jurisdiction is the authority to
review the action or judgments of an inferior
tribunal upon the record made in that
tribunal and to affirm, modify or reverse.
Humphrey at 497, quoting Peatross at 284.

The court then found

that bindover quashal "falls squarely within the classic
definition of an appeal."

Humphrey at 498.

9
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution
provides in part.
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited
by this constitution or by statute, and power
to issue all extraordinary writs.
There is neither constitutional nor statutory limitation on this
original jurisdiction. Humphrey at 497.
8

This reasoning of the Court of Appeals is unduly rigid,
particularly when Peatross is examined.

While Peatross v. Board

of Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) does state the general
definition of "appeal", the general rule is dicta in Peatross*
The Court of Appeals1 reading of Peatross as requiring
all appeal-like proceedings to be channeled through the
appellate process is particularly anomalous in view of the
actions of the Peatross court.

There, the court recognized that

the plaintiff had some right to review of the administrative
decision revoking her business license, and found that her right
could be satisfied through the district court's extraordinary
writ powers. JLd. at 283-284. The court explicitly noted that in
performing this review, the district court was not limited to
conducting the proceedings in the traditional appellate fashion,
and could receive evidence if necessary.
that

Ici. at 284.

It seems

ather than standing for rigid procedural rules, Peatross

exemplifies a workable approach to classification of judicial
•

10
Peatross involved an appeal from a district court order
denying a petition for trial de novo after an administrative
hearing, and directing the plaintiff to proceed by extraordinary
writ in the district court. Prior to proceeding to its analysis,
the court explicitly noted the scope of its holding, "Inasmuch as
that is the only order the district court has entered in this
case, it is the only appealable order; and therefore the
challenge to its propriety is the only matter we are directly
concerned with on this appeal." j[d. at 283.
11
See also Debry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals,
764 P.2d 627, 628 n. 3 (Utah App. 1988)(after Utah Court of
Appeals determined it had no statutory appellate jurisdiction, it
did note that judicial review could still be obtained through
extraordinary writ).

9

procedures.
Even if the Peatross definition of "appeal" were
correctly interpreted as mandating appellate procedure in all
12 .
cases resembling the definition of appeal,
it does not appear
that bindover quashal fits the definition.

"The standard rule is

that appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon the record made
in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or
judgment."

Peatross at 284 (emphasis added).

There is nothing

to support the assumption that the unique jurisdiction of
magistrate is "inferior" to the jurisdiction of the district
court or the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

See Utah Code

Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (indicating that a Justice of this Court
may exercise the jurisdiction of the magistrate).
The Court of Appeals' concession that it relies on
dicta in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), deserves
13
further explanation.
Mr. Schreuder1s contention before this
12
Motions to quash bindover orders are not the only
appeal-like functions that are performed regularly by the
district courts in the absence of a specific statutory grant of
appellate jurisdiction. For example, petitions for writs of
habeas corpus, review of orders dismissing informations for
insufficient evidence (which district courts perform when the
informations are refiled), see State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986), and review of the issuance of search and arrest
warrants, may fall within the general description of an appeal.
13
follows:

The Court of Appeals1 discussion of Schreuder is as
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, in
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985),
characterized an attack on a bindover order as an
appeal, stating:
Section 77-35-2(b)(3) provides that
10

Court was that because his preliminary hearing occurred in the
district/ rather than circuit court, he was deprived of equal
protection of the law when he could not obtain the usual district
court review of bindover orders.

Schreuder at 270. This Court

found that Mr. Schreuder1s right to review of the bindover order
was protected by this Court's interlocutory appeal provision.
Id.
The Court of Appeals' citations to City of Monticello
v. Christensen# 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), provide no support for
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that bindover quashal must be
treated as an appeal, beyond pointing to another quotation of the
Peatross definition of an appeal. Humphrey at 497 (discussing
Christensen in general, and finding it inapposite), and Humphrey
at 497 (citing Justice Durham's dissent in Christensen, which
quotes the Peatross definition).
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DO NOT EVIDENCE DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
OVER BINDOVER QUASHAL.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellants'
assertions that the district court's jurisdiction over improper
an appeal may be taken by the
defendant n[f]rom an interlocutory
order when, upon petition for
review, the supreme court decides
that such an appeal would be in the
interest of justice. . . . " That
statute governs all appeals from
bindover orders entered in any
court.
Id. at 270.
Humphrey at 497-498.
11

bindover orders (whether characterized as original or appellate)#
is recognized in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 10(c) provides,
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or
want or absence of any proceeding provided
for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignments shall be specifically and
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty
is entered or the same is waived.
The Court of Appeals declined to address the
possibility that this statute might evidence district court
jurisdiction over bindover quashal, finding the rule irrelevant
because none of the three cases involved a guilty plea.

Humphrey

at 498.
Given the Court of Appeals' duty to decide issues of
law in a manner "bringing consonance to Constitutional and
statutory provisions, which will be congruous with expressed
intent# and the applicability of the law in general/1 Monson v.
Hall, 584 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1978), the court should have
considered Rule 10(c).
Rule 12(b)(1) provides, in part,
The following shall be raised at least five
days prior to trial:
(1) defenses and objections
based on defects in the indictment
or information other than that it
fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense,
which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the
proceeding[.]
The Court of Appeals ruled that Rule 12 relates
strictly to facial, rather than substantive, defects in
12

informations.

14
Humphrey at 498.

There is nothing in the

language of Rule 12 limiting the rule to facial defects, or even
distinguishing between facial and substantive defects.

Thus, the

Court of Appeals' reading of Rule 12 appears unfounded.

See also

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c) (to proceed
properly to the district court, information must be supported by
probable cause); State v. Smith, 617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr.
1980)(affirming district court's "order quashing the information"
based on insufficient evidence presented at preliminary hearing).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gordan, Mr. Humphrey, and Mr. Mathews request that
this Court grant a writ of certiorari on question 1.
Respectfully submitted this

, 1990.

fAMES Ag^BRADSHAW
'Attorney for Mr. Gordan

NANCY BERGESON
Attorney for Mr.' Mathews

14
The Court of Appeals asserted that "[i]n their motions
to cjuash the bindover orders, defendants did not object to
defects in the informations. Rather, they objected to the orders
of the circuit courts binding them over for trial." Humphrey at
499. Mr. Gordan (R. 58) and Mr. Mathews (R. 65-66) explicitly
moved to quash the bindover order and dismiss the information,
although it seems that the latter would follow the former
naturally.
13

JOK
Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I# Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that /() copies
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court and
that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 St^ate Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, this

6

day of

DELIVERED by
day of

this

1990.

14

APPENDIX 1
OPINIONS AND ORDER DENYING REHEARING

496

Utah

794 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

the placement of the signs on specific sites
which were the same locations occupied by
the signs at the time the present parties
executed the existing lease, and that the
parties intended the lease to continue Reagan's right to maintain the signs only in
their existing locations. Although the evidence is controverted, "we assume that the
trial judge believed those aspects of the
evidence and the inferences reasonably
drawn from them that support his decision." Redevelopment Agency, 785 P.2d
at 1122 (quoting Brixen & Christopher,
Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039, 1042
(Utah Ct.App.1989)). Under our standard
of review, we will not set aside a trial
court's findings unless they are against the
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made, Smith v.
Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222,
1224-1225 (Utah Ct.App.1990), and we give
deference to the trial court's findings and
its opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Having examined the record, we conclude that the trial court's findings have
adequate evidentiary support and are not
clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm
its judgment
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.
(p

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Vaughn HUMPHREY, Defendant
and Appellant
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

over for trial. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya and
Frank G. Noel, JJ., declined to exercise
jurisdiction, and defendants appealed. Appeals were consolidated The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendants'
requests for review of legality of bindover
orders did not invoke district court's original jurisdiction, but rather were more accurately characterized as appeals, and (2) defendants' requests were not within appellate jurisdiction of district court.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <S=>1004
Defendants' motions to quash circuit
court bindover orders did not invoke district court's broad original jurisdiction, but
rather were more accurately characterized
as appeal, inasmuch as defendants sought
review of substantive merits of bindover
orders on records. U.C.A.1953, 77-3510(c), 77-35-12(bXl); Const A r t 8, § 5.
2. Criminal Law «=*1018
District court's appellate jurisdiction
must be conferred by statute. Const Art
8, § 5.
3. Criminal Law <&=»1018
District court did not have appellate
jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to
circuit court orders binding defendants
over for trial, in absence of any statutory
delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legislature vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in
Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15:
77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2Xd), 78-3-4(5).

v.

Harry Jamar GORDON, Defendant
and Appellant
Nos. 890424-CA, 89013O-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Defendants charged with felonies challonoroH fMiwrit
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nrHprQ hinHinor thpTYi

Elizabeth Bowman, Elizabeth Holbrook
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legal
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appellant, Humphrey.
'James C. Bradshaw, Elizabeth Holbrook
(argued), Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Legal
Defender Ass'n, for defendant and appellant Gordon
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R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Sandra
Sjogren (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt
t e City, for plaintiff and appellee the
5tate.
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
We have consolidated two criminal, interocutory appeals for decision as they
>resent the identical legal issue. Appelants Vaughn Humphrey ("Humphrey")
md Harry Jamar Gordon ("Gordon") ap>eal from two separate decisions of a disrict court wherein the trial judge concluded the district court did not have jurisdicion to review defendants' bindover orders
rom circuit court. We affirm.
Humphrey was charged with sixteen second or third degree felonies. Gordon was
harged with manslaughter, a second decree felony. In both cases, the circuit
ourt held preliminary hearings and bound
lefendants over for trial. Both defendants
vere ultimately arraigned before the disrict court
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon
ach filed a "motion to quash" his respecive bindover in district court, alleging the
tate had failed to establish probable cause
hat he had committed the crimes with
fhich he was charged. In response, the
tate argued the district court had no jurisiction to consider defendants' motions.
Tie district courts concluded defendants
rare, in substance, seeking an appellate
eview on the record of the circuit courts'
indover orders and that jurisdiction of
hese interlocutory appeals was vested in
tie Utah Court of Appeals, not the district
ourt. Humphrey and Gordon then filed
tiese interlocutory appeals.
This consolidated opinion requires us to
etermine whether the district courts proprly declined to exercise jurisdiction. This
resents a question of law and thus we
ccord no deference to the trial courts'
inclusions, but review them under a "corectness" standard. City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).

To resolve this jurisdictional question, we
review the recent constitutional and statutory changes in the jurisdiction of the district courts and the contemporaneous provisions which created the Utah Court of Appeals. As such, we are faced with an issue
of first impression.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
[1] Initially, defendants argue their motions to quash their bindover orders _ invoked the district court's original jurisdiction.
Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution currently provides, in pertinent
part
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and
power to issue all extraordinary writs.
Utah Const a r t VIII, § 5.
The district courts are given broad original jurisdiction by the Utah Constitution
limited only by specific constitutional or
statutory provisions. Statutory reference
to the district court's original jurisdiction
does not limit its broad jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1989) provides: "The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimin a l . . . . " Id. at § 78-3-4(1). We disagree
that the defendants' motions to quash their
bindover orders invoked the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
The Utah Supreme Court recently dealt
with the issue of what constitutes an appeal. Although the supreme court held
that the constitutional right to an appeal is
satisfied by a statutory trial de novo in a
court of record, City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990),
its decision does not refute the standard
rule that "appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the action or judgments
of an inferior tribunal upon the record
made in that tribunal and to affirm, modify
or reverse." Peatross v. Board of
Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976);
see also Christensen, 788 P.2d at 520 (Durham, J., dissenting). Defendants requested
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the district courts to review their bindover them over for trial. Rule 12(b)(1) gover
orders upon the record and requested the objections to the information itself, not "6!
orders be reversed on the basis of insuffi- jections to an order of the circuit court!
ciency of the evidence. This review falls finding that there was sufficient evidence
sguarely within the classic definition of an Presented in the preliminary hearing tg?
appeal
Support a finding of probable cause.1 | j i
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court,
Defendants also rely on Rule 10(c) of the'
in dicta, in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d
tltah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming
264 (Utah 1985), characterized an attack on
*t requires the district court to dispose of
a bindover order as an appeal, stating:
*U objections relating to the preliminary
Section 77-35-2(b)(3) provides that an apHearing during the exercise of the district
peal may be taken by the defendant
Court's original criminal jurisdiction. Rule
"[fjrom an interlocutory order when,
l0(c) states:
upon petition for review, the supreme
Any defect or irregularity in or want
court decides that such an appeal would
or
absence of any proceeding provided
be in the interest of justice
" That
for by statute or these rules prior to
statute governs all appeals from bindarraignment
shall be specifically and exover orders entered in any court.
pressly objected to before a plea of
Id at 270.
guilty is entered or the same is waived.
In support of their position, defendants
We read Rule 10(c) to merely reaffirm
claim that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Cnmmaf Procedure authorizes the district %he genera? legal rule that all objections,
court to hear motions to quash bindover deluding those to proceedings in the circuit
c
orders as part of its original jurisdiction in 0urt, must be made before a guilty plea is
e
htered or the objections will be waived.
criminal cases. Rule 12(b)(1) states:
We
are not dealing with the entry of a
(b) Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the ad- Suilty plea in these appeals and thus do not
missibility of evidence, which is capable $nd Rule 10(c) relevant to our analysis.
of determination without the trial of the
We are not persuaded by defendants'
general issue may be raised prior to trial attempts to demonstrate that their motions
by written motion. The following shall *0 quash the bindover orders invoked the
be raised at least five days prior to the ^strict courts' original criminal jurisdictrial:
tion. Rather, we agree with the district
(1) defenses and objections based on c0urts that defendants seek a review of the
defects in the indictment or informa- s\ibstantive merits of the bindover orders
tion other than that it fails to show °h- the record, a review more accurately
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an characterized as an appeal.
offense, which objection shall be noticed by the coart at any time daring
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
the pendency of the proceeding;
Defendants read too much into Rule 12.
In their motions to quash the bindover orders, defendants did not object to defects in
the informations. Rather, they objected to
the orders of the circuit courts binding
I. Defendants cite State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the district
court has original jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court In Brickey,
after describing the circumstances allowing a
refiling of an information and finding that those
"circumstances were not present, the court concluded, "the district court should have quashed

[2,3] Alternatively, defendants argue
^\at even if we characterize defendants'
requests for review of the legality of the
handover orders as appeals, the district
C(
*urt has jurisdiction.
the bindover." Id. at 648. However, defendants
concede that the statutory and constitutional
changes limiting the district courts' appellate
jurisdiction over the circuit courts occurred in
July 1986, six months after Brickey was decided.
Thus, the language referred to in Brickey is not
helpful in our resolution of this issue.

O i i l i l j

V.
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Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides: "The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by
statute." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Unlike its 1896 predecessor which provided
that a district court had "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and supervisory control of the same,"2 article VIII, section 5 now limits the district
courts1 appellate jurisdiction to only that
specifically provided for by statute. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals,
764 P.2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct.App.1988).?
The only reference to the appellate jurisdiction of the district court states:, "The
district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set
forth in Chapter 46b, Title 6 3 . . . . " 4 Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(5) (1989). The district
court's jurisdiction over agency adjudicative proceedings is further limited by Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1989) to only informal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, the
only appellate jurisdiction statutorily delegated to the district court is to review
informal agency adjudicative proceedings.
Under the current statutory scheme, the
legislature has vested appellate jurisdiction
2. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 7 (1953).
3. The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced
the principle that the district court's appellate
jurisdiction must be conferred by statute:
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that
"the district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute" and that "the
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original
and appellate, shall be provided by statute."
This language is plain and unambiguous.
City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513.
518 (Utah 1990).
4. Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953)
provided, in pertinent part: The district court
shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and.tribunals,
and a supervisory control over the same."
5. Also relevant is Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-11
(1987), which states in pertinent part, with our
emphasis, that: "Except as otherwise directed
by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the
Court of Appeals."
6. A magistrate is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-1-3(4) (1990) as "a justice of the Supreme

JLJLlvl^ JL
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over circuit court proceedings in the Utah
Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) reads:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(d) appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims department of a circuit court.5
Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit court in the Utah Court of Appeals.
We agree, but do not understand how this
helps defendants. Defendants must still
point to some statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to the district court. City
of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,
518 (Utah 1990).
Next, defendants correctly point out that
the circuit courts were sitting as magistrates, not in their normal jurisdictional
capacity, when they entered the bindover
orders.6 Defendants argue that when the
circuit court acts as a magistrate under
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 the bindover order is not a normal
Court, a judge of the district courts, a judge of
the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any
court created by law." The Utah Supreme
Court in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1977), held that a circuit court conducting
a preliminary hearing is not acting as a circuit
court but as a magistrate. The court explained:
A preliminary examination does not invoke
the jurisdiction of the court. In such a proceeding, the action is not action by a judge of
any court, but that of a magistrate, a distinct
statutory office. Justices of the Supreme
Court, district judges, city court judges, and
justices of the peace, when sitting as magistrates having the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those
that pertain to their respective judicial offices.
Id at 1327.
7. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(8)(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound
over in the district court
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has
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judgment or order of the circuit court.
They, therefore, reason that this is an exception to the general delegation of appellate jurisdiction over circuit court orders to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Again, we do not disagree with the defendants' argument in the abstract, but
cannot decipher how the argument helps
them/ Defendants still point to no statute
giving the district court jurisdiction over
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2Xe) (1989) vests "interlocutory
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a first
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was
acting as a court of record in a criminal
case when it held the preliminary hearing.
Finally, both defendants make a number
of policy arguments in favor of giving the
district courts jurisdiction over objections
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of
the evidence. Although some of their contentions have merit,8 such arguments must
be made to the legislature. It is the legislature which is charged with the task of
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction
and we cannot modify its decisions because
we believe policy considerations so dictate.
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of
the district courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, J J ,
concur.

Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Action was brought for divorce. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and
wife appealed, challenging property distribution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d
590, ordered wife to submit herself to process of lower court within 30 days or her
appeal would be dismissed. After wife
gave notice of compliance with order, merits of appeal were addressed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) postnuptial agreement not made in contemplation of divorce was enforceable, absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure,
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambiguously provided that it would apply to disposition of spouses' property in event of
divorce.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Husband and Wife <3=>30
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or
material nondisclosure.
2. Husband and Wife <*=>30
Postnuptial agreement not in contemplation of divorce is enforceable absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.
3. Husband and Wife e=>31(2)
Normal rules of contract construction
would be applied in resolving disagreement

been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant The
magistrate may enterfindingsof fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
(state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

8. Defendants correctly claim that because the
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is discretionary, defendants might be forced to go
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is
denied.

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 8906ff6-CA

Bruce Matthews,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood and Davidson

PER CURIAM:
This interlocutory appeal is taken from a district court
order denying appellant's motion to quash a bindover order of
the circuit court on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. We
affirm.
An examination of the facts of this case is unnecessary,
because the issue presented is a legal issue identical" to the
issue determined in the recent decision of State v. Humphrey,
No. 890424-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 1 9 9 0 ) . 1 T h a t
decision affirmed district court orders refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over motions to quash a circuit court bindover
order. Similarly, the trial court in the present appeal
entered an order stating that the district court "does not have
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence presented at
preliminary examination in circuit court to determine whether
the circuit court was correct in binding the matter over to
District Court" and, on that basis, ordered the motion to quash
bindover "stricken and/or denied."

1. This court consolidated two criminal, interlocutory appeals
for decision. The decision also determined State v. Gordon.
No. 890130-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 14, 1990).

Appellant's brief in this appeal raises the same legal
arguments in favor of district court jurisdiction as were
previously presented in State v. Humphrey and State v. Gordon.
The decision of this court in State v. Humohrev/State v. Gordon
is wholly dispositive of this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

R i c h a r d C. Davidson, Judge

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
^Vaughn Humphxeyj Harry Jamar
Gordan, and Bruce Mathews,

Case No. 890424-CA
Case No. 890130-CA
Case No. 890666-CA

Defendants and Appellants.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 28, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this ' T ^
FOR THE COURT

day of August, 1990.

APPENDIX 2
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 1
The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the district court,
and in such other courts as the legislature by
statute may establish. The supreme Court, the
district court, and such other courts designated
by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not
of record shall also be established by statute.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 3
The supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
two answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States. The supreme court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute,
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary
for the exercise of the supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any
cause.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 4
The supreme court shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence to be used in the courts
of the state and shall by rule manage the
appellate process. The legislature may amend the
rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the
supreme court upon a vote of two-thirds of all

members of both houses of the legislature.
Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the supreme court by rule may
authorize retired justices and judges and judges
pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to
practice law in Utah. The supreme court by rule
shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, section 5
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to
issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all
other courts, both original and appellate, shall
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the supreme court, there shall be
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4)
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the
Supreme Court, a judge of the district courts, a
judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the
circuit courts, a judge of the justice courts, or
a judge of any court created by law.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1
The following are courts of justice in this state:
(1) the Supreme Court;
(2) the Court of Appeals;
(3) the district courts;
(4) the circuit courts;
(5) the juvenile courts; and
(6) the justices' courts.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-2
The courts enumerated in the first five
subdivisions [subsections] of the preceding
section [{ 78-1-1] are courts of record.

Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for review of a Court of Appeals
adjudication [.]
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary;
(a) to carry into effect its judgments,
orders, an decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State
Tax Commission, Board of STate Lands, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) Appeals from the district court
review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action
under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any
court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree
or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in
criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other
criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of
or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;

(h) appeals from district court
involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody,
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military
Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion
only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original
appellate review and determination any matter of
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with
the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e)
(e) An appeal from an interlocutory order
may be granted only if it appears that the order
involves substantial rights and may materially
affect the final decision or that a determination
of the correctness of the order before final
judgment will better serve the administration and
interests of justice, the order permitting the
appeal may set forth the particular issue or
point of law which will be considered and may set
forth the particular issue or point of law which
will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and
damages, as the appellate court may determine.
If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be
deemed to have been docketed by the granting of
the petition, and all proceedings subsequent to
the granting of the petition shall be as, and
within the time required, for appeals from final
judgments.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and
will be granted only for special and important
reasons. The following, while neither
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of
appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the
Court of appeals on the same issue of law;

(b) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of the Supreme court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of
appeals has rendered a decision that has so
far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal,
state, or federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(8) (b) and (c)
•• • •

(8)
•• • •

(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in
writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. The findings of
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole
or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground
that it was acquired by unlawful means are not
properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has been
committed or that the defendant committed it, the
magistrate shall dismiss the information and
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and
discharge do not preclude the state from
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(c)
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or
absence of any proceeding provided for by statute
or these rules prior to arraignment shall be
specifically and expressly objected to before a
plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1)
(b) ...The following shall be raised at
least five days prior to trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on
defects in the indictment or information
other than that it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense, which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the pendency of
the proceeding[.]
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(c)
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
.. ..

(c) an interlocutory order when, upon
petition for review, the appellate court
decides that the appeal would be in the
interest of justice[.]

